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1. INTRODUCTION 
A major and long-standing focus of scholarly research in international business 
has been the identification and evaluation of determinants of the location of 
international production (Dunning, 1993; Caves, 1996). Most studies in this area 
attempt to identify and evaluate the most significant determinants of inward and 
outward foreign direct investment (FDI).  These empirical studies have generally carried 
out at the industry and country levels, while concentrating on overall FDI flows without 
distinguishing different modes of FDI (i.e. ‘greenfield’ investments or acquisitions). 
Highly aggregated FDI, used in virtually all previous empirical studies, resulted in little 
possibilities to ascertain differences between Dunning’s (1993; 2000) resource-seeking, 
market-seeking and efficiency-seeking FDI.  
FDI is alleged to be superior to other forms of external capital inflows. It is 
argued that FDI will have a more stimulating and long- lasting effect on economic 
growth because it is less volatile and can provide access to modern technology and 
know-how. Studies using highly aggregated FDI data, however, have thrown 
inconclusive evidence on the effects of FDI over economic growth (Caves, 1996). 
Among other things because the potential for transferring technology and know-how is 
strongly related to the mode of FDI in which industry participants are engaging in FDI 
(Nunnenkamp and Spatz, 2003). 
There are relatively few systematic studies documenting the mode of FDI and 
specifically looking at cross-border mergers and acquisitions (Ietto-Gillies et al., 2000; 
Amann and Ferraz, 2002; Evenett, 2003; Golberman and Shapiro, 2004). This in spite 
the fact that most FDI has increasingly being is created through cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A). Research in this article identified systematic differences in the 
trends and directions of Spanish acquisitions in Latin America. These trends reflected 
strategic decision-making with regards to targeted industrial sector and targeted 
geography while, at the same time, allowed testing for competitive (i.e. ownership 
specific) advantages in the international expansion and growth of Spanish MNCs. The 
assessment then provided a basis for some speculation about the evolution of Spanish 
firms as multinational corporations. 
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The document proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the context explains the 
emergence and growth of Spanish multinational companies in Latin America during the 
1990s. Section 3 details the data set and research methods. In particular this section 
offers a statistical assessment of trends and directions mergers and acquisitions 
involving Spanish MNCs in Latin America from an industry, country and individual 
company perspectives. Section 4 is the final section offering a summary, tentative 
conclusions and potential for future research. 
 
2. THE RISE OF THE SPANISH MNC 
2.1. The Spanish Economy in the 20th Century 
The modern industrialisation of Spain dates to 1959 when the Franco regime 
abandoned its policy of economic autarky and introduced an economic recovery plan 
(Harrison, 1985). This plan also aimed to retake the path of industrialisation, which had 
abruptly stopped in 1939. The reform of 1959, however, did little to foster growth of 
entities beyond Spanish borders. By 1970, Spain (together with Portugal) was one of 
two of the worst performers, in terms of international trade, among Western European 
countries as it had a rather high level of protection – as measured by an index of 
estimates of nominal tariff levels for manufacturers (Little et al., 1970). The return to a 
democratic government (effective with a new Constitution in 1978) continued with 
many of the industrial policies of the Franco regime. Although economic policy then 
successfully articulated a social pact (around the Fuentes Quintana reform of 1977), 
regulatory changes were unable to withstand the second oil-crisis of 1979 and a deep 
economic recession ensued – which included the crisis of- and increase concentration in 
the commercial bank sector. However, the ascension to the European Union (1986) 
brought about renewed growth with the Spanish economy ‘booming’ at an average rate 
of five percent per annum between 1986 and 1990.  
Throughout the 1980s and as documented in Salmon (1997), López Duarte and 
García Canal (2002) and Rodríguez (2002), trends and directions of investment in Spain 
were influenced by the globalisation of the world economy (i.e. deepening integration of 
international commercial and financial activity), ascension to the European Union, and 
the role of the public sector (increasing Spain’s exposure to international markets on the 
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back of European integration and working towards the adoption of a single European 
currency but, at the same time, pursuing industrial policies of ‘national champions’). 
These trends portray the changing character of the economic environment in the last 
quarter of the 20th century resulting in a continuous process of restructuring in the 
Spanish economy (mediated through structural and regulatory innovations). From 1980 
onwards, these trends resulted in Spain (together with Portugal, Greece and Ireland) 
gradually moving from a position of being overwhelmingly a host country of foreign 
investment to an intermediate status (Chesnais and Simonetti, 2000, p. 9).  
Although the internationalisation of Spanish firms accelerated during the 1990s, 
both Tolentino (1993) and Lall (1996) identify Spain as ‘late investor’. In other words, 
given the relative size and growth of Spain’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), there 
should have been greater stocks of investments abroad than the level observed at the 
turn of the Millennium. Some arguments traditionally put forward to explain ‘late 
investor’ include limited technological capacity, barriers to international trade, low 
skills, and poor labour mobility. Among others Canals (1991) and Cazorla  (1997a, b)  
identified a lack of financial sources as the main obstacle to the internationalisation of 
Spanish firms, particularly for small and medium-sized companies which were often 
marginalised from government support promoting foreign investment. 
Table 1 illustrates the country distribution of Spanish FDI during the 1990s as 
measured by highly aggregated data and grouped by members of the élite Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Latin America and the Rest of 
the World. According to Fernández and Norniella (1998), a stable macro-economic 
policy at home and the inclination of Spanish entrepreneurs towards an ‘international 
culture’ played an important role in the steep increase of FDI activity at the end of the 
1990s.  
[Table 1 here] 
As measured in nominal prices and as a percentage of total cross-border 
investments, most Spanish investments abroad aimed at OECD countries and Latin 
America, with a sharp fall in that oriented to the rest of the world since 1995. Trends in 
Table 1 shows that Spanish FDI in Latin America peaked in 1999 at 35,504 million 
euros (57% of total Spanish FDI for that year). Trends in Table 1 were consistent with 
systematic analysis by Ietto-Gilles et al. (2000, p. 60), which documented evidence of 
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Spanish FDI (together with that of Portugal and Greece) observing a preference for 
global links rather than greater integration within the European Union (EU).  This was 
indeed surprising given the Spanish government’s policies promoting greater integration 
with European markets and creating Spanish ‘national champions’ - entities expected to 
do well in European markets. 
[Figure 1 around here] 
Data emerging from cross border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) transactions 
were consistent with trends described by highly aggregated data. A focus on 
acquisitions as mode of international expansion assumes that the acquiring firm 
perceives greater net benefits from internalising foreign production rather than engaging 
through open markets or licence the right to do so (Dunning, 2000). Data on cross 
border M&A has the added advantage of giving insights to the market for corporate 
control. For instance, the possibility that FDI investments pursued more than production 
facilities and sought non-tangible assets (such as brand names, management skills and 
local know-how). Geographic distribution of Spanish cross border M&A transactions 
raised questions as to the concentration of Spanish investments in Latin America around 
a handful of countries. As summarised in Figure 1, Argentina (87 transactions), Brazil 
(72 transactions), Mexico (50 transactions) and Chile (44 transactions), were the 
preferred markets for acquisitions of Spanish entities in Latin America. These four 
countries represented 75% of total cross-border acquisitions in the region (253 
transactions), with activity in other 13 Latin America countries accruing 25% (84 
transactions) of the total. 
Succinctly, growth of Spanish MNCs in Latin America through cross boder 
acquisitions is an interesting phenomenon and one in need of systematic attention. 
Spanish trade in that region involved relocating non-trivial quantities of resources. For 
individual entities this processes represented the greatest level of internationalisation. 
Anecdotal evidence of trends and directions in aggregate flows of Spanish FDI into 
Latin America would suggest that the competitive advantage of Spanish entities abroad 
is different from that at home, pointing to the need of examining the sources of 
competitive advantage for the Spanish MNC. However, inferences on FDI decisions 
from highly aggregated data risks biased results because aggregate data offers little 
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insights as to who owned the assets, who undertook the investments or what was the 
motivation to pursue such investments.  
2.2. Latin America at the End of the 20th Century 
Whereas Spanish entities have been grouped together with those of France, Italy, 
Portugal and Belgium in a cluster of 'Latin European' countries (Ronen and Shenkar, 
1985), those in Spanish speaking America have been grouped in a related but somewhat 
different cluster. With the exception of Brazil, which was considered an 'independent', 
and the Guyanas; entities in continental Central and South American economies have 
been grouped into a Latin American cluster, that is, grouped into a meaningful category 
based on shared features such as geography, language, religion and management 
practice (idem). 
By 1970 a widespread policy of industrialisation and substitution of imports for 
local products implemented in the decades that followed the Second World War resulted 
in many Latin American countries observing a level of protection that surpassed that of 
Spain – as measured by an index of estimates of nominal tariff levels for manufacturers 
(Little et al., 1970). An increasingly protectionist stand did not preclude, however, the 
entry of multinational companies from the US (e.g. Coca Cola, Procter and Gamble), 
Europe (e.g. Glaxo, Volkswagen, Danone, Phillips) and Japan (e.g. Sony, Honda, 
Nissan) into Latin American countries. During the 1970s many Latin American 
countries benefited from high international commodity prices. Economic growth 
rocketed for the likes of Ecuador, Mexico, Venezuela and Brazil, which had been 
endowed with considerable oil reserves as ever increasing oil prices meant increasing 
revenues for oil producing countries. Unable to invest all the oil revenues at home, 
countries such as Venezuela, Nigeria and Kuwait made large deposits in international 
banks. A number of international banks found themselves sitting on large pools of 
money looking for a ‘home’, which they found by lending to governments and large 
corporations in emerging markets such as Mexico. At the time, the prospect of higher 
rates of economic growth on the back of rising commodity prices (particularly in oil 
producing countries) suggested there were attractive growth opportunities for entities 
located in Mexico and Latin America. Trade protection and in particular cumbersome 
procedures for FDI suggested local entities had greater chance of success in capturing 
those growth opportunities than foreign firms. Thus, it seemed a good idea for local 
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entities in Latin America to get indebted. The problem was that this was 
overwhelmingly short-term debt (i.e. with maturity of less than a year).  
The price of oil collapsed when the main oil producing countries failed to reach 
a production agreement. This came on the back of economic recession in many 
industrialised countries and the subsequent drop in international commodity prices due 
to the lack of demand. Many Latin American countries then did not have enough money 
to service its foreign debt. As an alternative to withholding all payments, in August 
1982 the Mexican government requested international debtors to reschedule the 
commitments of state and private companies. Other measures involved the 
nationalisation of the private banking system, a major devaluation of the currency and 
the setting up of strict exchange controls. A preferential exchange rate was set for 
imports and payments of international claims. Another rate (50% above the preferential 
rate) was set for exports, tourism and repayment, to Mexican retail clients, of deposits in 
dollars in Mexican banks. The move by Mexico was match or even surpassed by others 
(for instance, non-agreed moratoria on their international obligations by Brazil and 
Argentina) and a decade long period of economic and political turmoil then ensued.  
 The collapse of international commodity prices (including oil) brought about a 
severe economic recession from 1982 onwards (the so called ‘lost decade’) as well as a 
programme of internal reform which dominated the agenda of most Latin American 
countries well into the 1990s. Loan agreements with the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank led most countries to abandon protectionism and embrace market 
reform (including the promotion of international trade). Debt negotiations with 
international consortia of international banks (such as Citibank from the US and Lloyds 
Bank from the UK) effectively withdrew most countries from international debt 
markets. At the same time, highly volatile growth, uncertainty around debt negotiations 
and internal reform resulted in the dearth of international investments from ‘traditional’ 
sources such as the US, Japan and Western European countries. However, by 1995 
regulatory changes in most Latin American countries had resulted in extensive 
privatisation of public enterprises and substantial investments from firms whose 
headquarters were established outside that region (for instance R. La Porta and Lòpez de 
Silanes, 1999; Love and Lage-Hidalgo, 1999a; 1999b; 2000; Calderòn et al., 2002;  Len 
et al., 2002).    
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In summary, the ‘lost decade’ of the 1980’s lowered the overall attractiveness of 
Latin America as a destination for cross-border investments. Multinational corporations 
(MNC) based in countries with high FDI stock in the region (i.e. the US, Japan and 
Western European countries such as UK, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands) 
in many cases completely withdrew their operations and even refused to work through 
agents or licensing agreements. Some sectors and in particular international financial 
services were unwilling or unable to capture opportunities within the region. Thereby, 
key players that otherwise would have competed against the Spanish MNC (such as the 
banks) were totally absent. 
2.3. Trends and Directions of Spanish Acquisitions in Latin America 
Figure 2 summarises the sector distribution of Spanish investment in Latin 
America during the 1990s. Investments in financial services (41% of total) and utilities 
(namely transport and communications at 36%) stand out from investments made in 
other sectors. Targets of Spanish foreign operations in Latin America during the 1990s 
were quite different from economic activity in Spain, whose exports were dominated by 
tourism, textiles and apparel (including footwear), agri-business, machine tools, medical 
equipment, shipbuilding, clay and refractory products. Sector distribution of FDI during 
the 1990s also showed marked differences with cross-border growth of Spanish 
manufacturing during the 1980s as documented by Nohria and García Pont (1991), 
Rubalcaba and Gago (2001) and Bajo Rubio and López Pueyo (2002).  
[Figure 2 here] 
Figure 2 summarises M&A activity in Latin America per industrial sector 
(measured by two-digit SIC Code of target firms). These figures show the most popular 
sector was Depository Institutions (two digit SIC Code 60) with 48 transactions; 
followed by Electric, gas and sanitary services (49) with 45 transactions, 
Communications (48) with 38 transactions, Business Services (73) with 27, and 
Insurance carriers (63) with 25 transactions. Together these five sectors represented 183 
transactions or 54% of total, with 46% of activity in other 21 two-digit sectors 
(averaging 6.4 transactions and standard deviation of 3.47). The absence or low 
incidence of transactions in sectors such as pharmaceuticals, education, chemicals, 
information technology and others in high technology areas were not surprising as 
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Spain, given its status of ‘intermediate’ country, required significant FDI (and its 
associated transfer of  ‘know how’) by MNC based in ‘Triad’ countries during the 
1980s and 1990s.  
At an international level, growth of Spanish financial service MNC's was 
atypical. Similar organisations in other OECD countries (and particularly for US-based 
banks) usually ‘lagged’ rather than ‘lead’ manufacturing firms in their degree of 
internationalisation (Tschoegl, 1987; Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2001; Tschoegl, 2002). 
Moreover, data for US companies supported the idea that banks and other financial 
organisations ‘followed’ manufacturers outside the US, and while financial services 
firms may not locate in the same country they would establish in the same region (see 
further von der Ruhr, 2000).  However, the ‘debt crisis’ of the 1980s resulted in a 
number of financial institutions in the US and Western Europe unwilling or unable to 
grow across borders while Japanese banks also abandoned the international scene thanks 
to a long-running recession in their home markets during the 1990s. As a result, 
between 1980 and 1990 there was greater integration of international financial markets 
thanks to technological developments rather than through the geographic diversification 
of banks. 
Table 2 summarises cross-border acquisitions of individual Spanish firms in 
Latin America. Data in Table 2 suggested Spanish MNC activity in Latin America could 
have been the result of a handful of companies as by financial services and utilities 
stand out from investments made by other sectors. However, an average value per 
transaction of US$426 million for all 228 transactions (with details regarding the 
transaction's value) suggested that, although most Spanish firms had been involved in 
six or less transactions, M&A activity between 1987 and 2001 distributed throughout a 
broad range of sectors. This was corroborated in Table 2 which shows Spanish firms 
sought equity control in their cross-border growth although the size of individual 
investments was wide ranging (from US$18 million to US$1,420 million). 
[Table 2 here] 
Trends and directions of Spanish in cross-border M&A in Figure 1 and Table 2 
would suggest that there was a preference for a reduced number of sectors in a limited 
number of countries, concentration which did not seem to have played at the strengths 
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of the home country and which suggested that the competitive advantage of Spanish 
firms abroad was different to that at home. Under the light of not playing on home 
country strengths, growth of the Spanish MNC through acquisition would suggest that 
Spanish multinationals were driven by the search of new market opportunities (such as 
unsatisfied demand abroad) or responding an excess installed capacity in Spain.  
However, the emergence of the Spanish MNC was embedded in a more complex 
setting. Specifically, the atypical geographical (i.e. Latin America) and sector (i.e. 
predominance of banking and utilities) distribution of Spanish cross border investments 
responded to the inability (and unwillingness) of MNCs from the so-called ‘Triad’ 
countries (US, Japan and Western Europe) to increase their stocks of FDI in Latin 
America. Some sectors where Spanish MNCs were absent in Latin America (such as 
consumer goods and pharmaceuticals) were part of the global dominance of MNCs 
based ‘Triad’ countries and this dominance also helps explaining geographic and sector 
concentration of Spanish acquisitions in Latin America.  However, along side the 
apparent concentration of Spanish acquisitions in Latin America being limited to a few 
countries and few markets, trends in cross border mergers and acquisitions involving 
Spanish firms also suggested there were significant investments in Latin America by 
Spanish MNC, which went beyond utilities and banking. For instance, there were 
significant investments in many other areas such as railroads, road construction, oil and 
gas, etc. In the following section these trends are reassessed to examine the statistical 
significance of the determinants of FDI investment decisions. In this process, the 
analysis will shed light as to whether the competitive advantage of Spanish firms in 
Latin America was different from that at home and the extent to which these decisions 
responded to Dunning’s (1993; 2000) resource-seeking, market-seeking and efficiency-
seeking FDI as measured by market size (Mij), wage effects (Wij) and 'cultural affinity' 
(Cij). 
3. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
3.1. Analysis Framework 
Assessing the determinants of individual FDI decisions (Sn) is still full of 
challenges and an area worthy of attention. Empirical research is inconclusive as to the 
links between international diversification and superior financial performance (Palich, 
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Cardinal et al., 2000; Palich, Carini et al., 2000; Martin and Sayrak, 2003) while debate 
also prevails as to the accuracy of constructs to measure international diversification 
(Nayvar, 1992; Sambharya, 2000; Hyland and Diltz, 2002). The nature of FDI decisions 
also grew in complexity when, as a result of changes in the world economy during the 
last quarter of the 20th century, multinational corporations (MNC) were encouraged to 
expand into emerging economies (Arnold and Quelch, 1998; Luo, 2001; Amann and 
Ferraz, 2002; Nunnenkamp and Spatz, 2003). Emerging markets were perceived to offer 
significant growth opportunities for MNCs as inefficient markets for corporate control 
in less developed countries suggested there were opportunities for a foreign buyer to pay 
a price not fully reflecting the prospects of a new unit. Indeed, entities from countries 
lower down the technological ladder can develop transferable advantages relative to 
firms (existing or potential) in even less developed countries since the former could 
benefit from advantages associated to a more advanced stage of development and 
industrialisation (Hu, 1995, p. 84). Possibilities to exploit market-value and operational 
differences emerge as in less developed countries large companies are few, financial 
resources are less abundant and professional management is scarce (Porter, 1987, pp. 49 
and 52;  Hu, 1995, pp. 84-5).  
Growth into emerging markets, however, could poise strategic questions that 
established frameworks could not resolve (Arnold and Quelch, 1998; Cuervo and 
Villalonga, 2000; Dharwadkar et al., 2000) and hence attraction of looking at individual 
decisions of FDI through acquisition. Namely, the potential to learn more about who 
owns the assets, who is making the investments or what is the motivation to pursue such 
investments. As mentioned above, the assessment of FDI acquisition decisions is often 
based on aggregate data and fieldwork typically assumed that all firms in one country 
and/or in one industry were equally likely grow across borders and for similar reasons. 
The research that follows compares and contrasts individual and aggregate MNC 
behaviour. FDI acquisition decisions into less developed countries were explored by 
looking at the interaction between idiosyncratic elements of individual transactions (sn) 
with demand (Mij), wage (Wij) cultural affinity (Cij) effects. 
Sn = f (sn, Mij,Wij, Cj, ti-1j)        (1) 
where  
Sn  Value of FDI decision.  
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sn  Financial characteristics of individual transactions.  
Mij  Demand (i.e. market size) effect.  
Wij  Wage differential effect. 
Cj  Cultural affinity effect. 
tI-1j  Trend (lagged). 
N Transaction number. 
i  Year. 
J Country. 
 
It is worth noting that empirical research around FDI decisions into less 
developed countries has emphasised cross-border growth into Asian economies (e.g. 
Chen and Chen, 1998; Luo, 2001; Makino et al., 2002; Wong and Ellis, 2002), former 
communist countries in Eastern Europe (e.g. Uhlenbruck and De Castro, 2000; Buck et 
al., 2001; Beyer, 2002; Meyer, 2002) or US investments in Latin America (e.g. Grosse, 
1992; Love and Lage-Hidalgo, 1999a; 1999b; 2000; Len et al., 2002). As a result, a 
neglected area of research has been to consider and explore diversification decisions of 
firms in 'recently' industrialised countries into even less developed countries as 
portrayed by growth of Spanish firms into Latin America. Moreover, this approach 
provided an opportunity to document the process of emergence and growth of the 
multinational corporation outside of the US. An interesting example of this process is 
the ‘late’ arrival of the Spanish MNC and the predominance of their FDI decisions 
throughout Latin America during the 1990s (Cazorla Papis, 1997a; Ietto-Gillies et al., 
2000). 
3.2. The Data Set  
Since the late 1980s and by the mid-1990s three quarters of the world’s FDI took 
the form of mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Given that only a quarter of world-wide 
cross-border growth takes the  form of new (‘greenfield’) investment, one could take the 
view that FDI pertains more to changes in the ownership of capital and to industrial 
restructuring than to the accumulation of capital (Chesnais and Simonetti, 2000, p. 5). 
This is consistent with the view by Kogut (1983; 1991), Buckley and Casson (1998) and 
Meyer and Estrin (2001) which considers FDI acquisition decisions as leading to the 
creation of growth options ex ante and sequential growth ex post. For these reasons the 
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research on the growth of Spanish FDI focused on M&A activity of Spanish firms in 
Latin America. 
However and as noted by Calderón et al. (2002, p. 6),  direct comparison of FDI 
data compiled from balance of payment sources with M&A figures is subject to a 
number of caveats namely the timing of the transaction, their scope, and the definition 
of target and foreign countries. First, while FDI is measured on an accrual basis by 
national accounting systems, M&As are recorded at the time of announcement or 
closure of each specific transaction. Second, individual transactions may include a 
sequence of payments over several years. Third, traditional FDI accounting considers 
net financial flows, that is, outward FDI from a given country is adjusted by the dis-
investment abroad undertaken by firms from that country. Unlike FDI accounting, 
M&A transactions report only the total value of the acquisition abroad, without 
subtracting any possible sales of foreign affiliates (which would be reported as an 
independent transaction). Fourth, data on cross-border M&A may include funds raised 
in local and international financial markets which would not qualify as FDI. And fifth, 
there may be methodological differences between M&A and FDI accounting regarding 
the country of origin and destination. Namely, FDI flows are usually compiled on the 
basis of immediate host and immediate home countries, whereas data on cross-border 
M&A may use different combinations of immediate and ultimate country. All these 
facts suggest caution when comparing cross-border M&A and total FDI for a given 
country. However, trends and directions of FDI flows and cross-border M&A 
transactions reach the same conclusions as to the direction of change rather than its 
magnitude (Chesnais and Simonetti, 2000, p. 5). 
Empirical analysis presented below is based on a data set created from the SDC 
(2002) and sorted by Standard Industry Classification (SIC) criteria of the US 
Department of Labor. Data was available between January 30th 1987 to December 31st  
2001. A total of 512 cross-border acquisitions involving Spanish and Latin American1 
firms were identified2, of which 459 considered Spain a bidder (i.e. nation of the 
                                                 
1 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
2  A caveat similar to other assessment of companies’ data with a sector breakdown, is that service sector 
might be under-recorded because companies are classified according to their main line of activity. For 
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acquiring firm)3 and Latin America as the target. Information regarding the financial 
value of deals was available for only a sub-set of the data (228 transactions or 50% of 
total). For this reason the assessment initially moved forward using only the number of 
deals to test for unrelated diversification while the value of deals was used when 
different patterns emerged (more below).  
Data was also available for the share of total equity owned after individual 
transactions (399 transactions or 87% of total). Using ownership data, 26 transactions 
were excluded from the total. This to consider transactions where the Spanish firm had 
purchased more than 10% of equity (i.e. ‘capital social’ 4). Excluding transactions of 
9.99% or less allowed distinguishing between investments leading to or creating 
‘options to expand’ from simple financial investments. There were 96 transactions with 
no data regarding per cent owned after acquisition and these were also excluded. As a 
result, the assessment moved forward using data for 337 transactions when assessing the 
number of deals (while testing for related/unrelated diversification) and 228 transactions 
when assessing the value of the deals (while testing for trends and directions of cross-
border acquisitions).  
3.3. Empirical Model 
The data set on individual transactions was sorted to include specific 
characteristics of each country and year to form a panel as specified in model 1 above.  
This database was the basis to proceed with the empirical assessment of the value of 
FDI decisions (Sn). These decisions were measured by the proportion of the value of an 
individual transaction in Latin America represented in the total annual value of cross-
border transactions where Spain had been the country of the acquiring firm.  
The interaction of financial characteristics of individual transactions (sn) and the 
effects of demand (Mij), wage (Wij) and cultural affinity (Cij) constructs was tested to 
                                                                                                                                               
instance, companies such as IBM generated over 40% of income from services in 2001 yet the parent-
company’s main line of activities was classified under hardware manufacturing. This bias against service 
industries is, perhaps, mitigated by the fact that industry classification of the deal refers to the unit whose 
ownership has been transferred rather than to the whole group (i.e. the parent company).  
3 Country classification of the deal refers to the nation state of the unit whose ownership has been 
transferred and the unit who has acquired rather than the whole group (i.e. the parent company). 
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investigate systematic differences between trends and directions of FDI decisions using 
aggregate and individual transaction data. A total of 110 constructs were used in 
assessing determinants of the value of individual FDI decisions, Sn (Hofstede, ;  
UNCTAD, 1992; 1996; R.  La Porta et al., 1998; CEPAL, 2000; OIT, 2002; SDC, 2002; 
2002; Euromoney, 2003). These constructs are not presented for brevity but are 
available from the corresponding author. Succinctly, 39 different constructs (35%) 
provided details as to the financial characteristics (sn) of each and every one of the 228 
transactions were the financial value was available for acquisitions involving Spanish 
MNCs in Latin America. There were 16 constructs (15%) dealing with terms of trade 
and ‘degree of openness’ were identified as potential measures of market size (Mij). Six 
constructs (5%) considered relative income measures and an index for the intensity of 
union militancy throughout the work force and were identified as potential measures 
wage effects (Wij). Eight constructs (7%) considered trends and directions of M&A 
activity (ti-1) and thus accounted for issues such as 'herd effects', growth in the stock of 
FDI and a reduction in the number of potentially suitable acquisition targets.  
Instrumental variables were added to identify transactions involving the most 
active companies as described in Table 1 and Figure 3 (d1). Another variable modelled 
the main recipients of Spanish FDI in terms of number of transactions as described in 
Figure 2 (d2). There were eleven instrumental variables (10%) as specified below. 
Cultural compatibility has increasingly been sought to provide an explanation as 
to why domestic and cross-border acquisitions succeed or fail (e.g. Kogut and Singh, 
1988; Gomez-Mejia and Palich, 1997). While favourable financial statements or product 
synergy may be the initial attraction to an acquisition candidate, it has increasingly been 
argued that whether an acquisition actually works may have more to do with how well 
the two organisations' 'cultures' match up. Data to assess 'cultural affinity' (Cij) included 
dimensions external and external to individual entities. External to the organisation, it 
was important to model the market for corporate control. In particular, 26 (24%) 
constructs were identified to represent the rights granted to the shareholders by the legal 
environment as well as the effectiveness of the judiciary to uphold these rights (R.  La 
                                                                                                                                               
4 Art. 4.1., Real Decreto 672/1992, 2nd July, considers Spanish foreign investments and establishes that “it 
is presumed that effective influence exists in a foreign firm management when the investor’s 
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Porta et al., 1998). Dimensions which seem to have been critical to explain growth of 
MNCs in some Latin American countries (R. La Porta and Lòpez de Silanes, 1999).  
At the same time, the internal environment was represented by difference 
between the rank of Spain and the rank of each individual county as scored in 
Hofstede's (1991) four indexes of national culture (4%). Stylised features of corporate 
culture such as those emerging from grounded work by Hofstede are not without critics 
(Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars, 1997; Hennart and Larimo, 1998; McSweeney, 
2002; Baskerville, 2003). However, these indexes have been used extensively in 
empirical research as measures of national culture and explanations of the interaction 
between national culture and management (Hofstede, 2002; Williamson, 2002). As a 
result, the empirical assessment of the 'cultural affinity' construct (Cij) assumed 
differences between countries were greater than differences between different 
organisations or differences between organisations in the same industry or sector. 
3.4. Sector Level Analysis 
Following Ietto-Gilles et al. (2000, p. 62), an indicator of ´abnormal´ M&A 
activity (either more or less than expected), was developed to  compare related and 
unrelated diversification. Each element of this matrix measured the number of 
transactions between a two digit SIC code in Spain and a two digit SIC code in Latin 
America. In this matrix related diversification was measured by the elements on the 
main diagonal (that is, TO the same SIC code as FROM the same SIC code). Unrelated 
diversification was measured by the off-diagonal elements.  Cohen's kappa was used as 
measure of dispersion from the main diagonal (Wilcox, 1996) and an estimate of k = 
0.52 suggested there was more than chance agreement for related diversification of 
cross-border activity. 
To identify sectors where unrelated diversification was statistically significant, 
the matrix with M&A flows was compared with another matrix that considered 
´theoretical´ frequencies that would appear in the absence of any particular strong link 
between two sectors. The matrix with expected flows represented the number of 
transactions between a two digit SIC code in Latin America and a two digit code in 
Spain that would occur in the absence of any factors that would favour particular 
                                                                                                                                               
participation, direct or indirect,  is equal or superior to 10% of the social capital”.  
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relationships (i.e. particularly high or particularly low) between any one pair of two 
digit codes. The matrix for actual flows and the matrix for ´theoretical´ flows were 
compared using an indicators based on the chi-squared, namely 
Uij = (S(Aij - Eij)2 ) / Eij        (2)  
where  
i  Total number of transactions for two digit SIC code of targets in Latin 
America. 
j Total number of transactions for two digit SIC code in Spain. 
The indicator for unrelated diversification, Uij, resulted from the square value of 
the difference between the actual flow, Aij, and the expected flow, Eij. The expected 
number of transactions, Eij, between a two digit SIC code in Spain and a two digit SIC 
code in Latin America was calculated by multiplying the row and column totals relative 
to the cell and dividing by the product by the overall total.5 Insights into specific 
patterns of unrelated diversification emerged when comparing Uij to a c2 of 68.77 (with 
45 d.f. and 5% significance)6 and thus rejecting (or not) the null hypothesis of equal 
distribution of means. 
Following the US SIC classification for the 1987 census, there were 31 two-digit 
SIC codes (39%) in both Spain and Latin America without any activity at all (see further 
the Appendix for detailed results). At the same time, there were 14 industries (18%) in 
where a two digit SIC code in Latin America (i.e. the target) or a two digit SIC code in 
Spain ware active but the indicator, Uij, was not statistically significant. There were 11 
industries (14%) where a two digit SIC code in Spain and a two digit SIC code in Latin 
America were active but only one was statistically significant. Table 3 summarises these 
results. 
[Table 3 here] 
                                                 
5 Note that using the average number of transactions to calculate the expected number of transactions (Eij) 
was equally problematic given the cyclical nature of both M&A and FDI decisions (phenomena which is 
well documented). 
6 For 30 d.f. or more the chi-squared statistic is considered to distribute as a normal with mean 1 and 
variance 0. An approximation to 45 d.f resulted from adding the values for the chi-squared with 15 d.f. 
(25) to that with 30 d.f. (43.77)  for a 5% level of significance. 
 
 
 
 
19 
As shown in Table 3, MNCs from six Spanish industries pursued unrelated 
diversification. This trend is perhaps more evident in investment in five Latin American 
industries where companies were acquired by an unrelated Spanish industry. These are 
target and acquiring industries with extreme values and one should avoid taking these 
results to portray the only industries observing unrelated diversification. However, 
visual examination of individual transactions suggested these transactions were not far 
apart within the value chain. For instance, Banco Santandar Central Hispano (SIC 60) 
acquiring a security broker (SIC 62).  Results in Table 3 could thus be biased because of 
the classification method used when sorting by SIC criteria. 
Table 4 shows 24 industrial sectors (30%) where two digit SIC code in Latin 
America and in Spain were both active and both were statistically significant. These 
sectors encompassed most of the industries making related diversification and show that 
cross-border activity of Spanish MNCs in Latin America concentrated in but a handful 
of industries. 
[Table 4 here] 
Succinctly, in order to investigate the pattern of foreign investment through 
cross-border M&A, a matrix was created examining the flow of M&A (number of 
deals) between pairs of industries (as measured by two digit SIC codes). The aim was to 
asses whether trends in M&A transactions could help in ascertain links between M&A 
activity and the competitive advantage of Spanish firms in Latin America. As suggested 
by descriptive evidence in the previous, an approximation using Cohen's kappa and c2 
suggested that foreign investment of Spanish MNC´s in Latin America during the 1990s 
was heterogeneous and concentrated in a few industries. These tests, however, were 
unable to tell whether related diversification associated with the successful transfer of 
competencies, market opportunities and accessing resources to supply foreign markets. 
In the following section an assessment is made as to the growth of Spanish MNCs in 
Latin America in terms of market opportunities and environmental risk 
3.5. Country Level Analysis 
A second statistical test looked at the empirical significance of model 1 above 
through a regression model, namely  
Sn = aj + Sn bnj (sn, Mij,Wij, Cj, ti-1j) + Sm bmj d j + f AR(9) + en  (3) 
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where  
Sn  Value of FDI decision (as measured by firm-level transaction data).  
sn  Financial characteristics of individual transactions.  
Mij  Demand (i.e. market size) effect.  
Wij  Wage differential effect. 
Cj  Cultural affinity effect. 
ti-1j  Trend (lagged). 
d j Instrumental variables 
a) Value of 1 when purchaser was a financial service firm (BBVA, BSCH or Mapfre).  
b) Value of 1 when purchaser was  a utility (Telefonica, Repsol, Endesa, Mapfre or Union 
Fenosa). 
c) Value of 1 when country was Argentina, Brazil, Chile or Mexico. 
AR(9) Autoregresive adjustment  (Cochrane-Orcutt method). 
en Residual. 
n Transaction number. 
m Number of instrumental variables. 
i  Year. 
j Country. 
 
 The 110 constructs identified as potential determinants of the value of individual 
FDI decisions (Sn) were reduced to 22 constructs. See Table 5. Firstly, pre-regression 
test used cross sections by year (1999 and 2001) as well as countries (Argentina and 
Colombia) and found 28 construc ts were unable to contribute to the assessment.7 For 
instance, most of the details as to the financial characteristics of the transaction (sn) were 
lost as these constructs overwhelmingly had a value of zero. Other constructs and 
notably wage effect characteristics (Wij) as well as differences in the culture of the 
market for corporate control (C j), were found to contribute little in the way of 
explaining the value of individual cross-border transactions.  Secondly, during test for 
linear correlation, loss of constructs came about in order to avoid the potential spurious 
relation between some of them (i.e. multicolinearity) as the model had to be corrected 
for autocorrelation and heterocedasticity. 
[Table 5 here] 
As a result of the careful screening, 11 constructs (50%) provided details as to 
the financial characteristics of the transactions (sn). There were six constructs (27%) 
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dealing with terms of trade and degree of openness. These had been identified as 
potential measures of market size (Mij). Two constructs (9%) represented measures of 
national culture (Cij). Two constructs (9%) considered trends and directions of M&A 
activity (ti-1). One instrumental variable (5%) was added to identify transactions 
involving the most active companies (i.e. utilities) as described in Table 2 above (d1). 
No-one constructs identified as potential measures wage effects (Wij) was found to have 
had statistically significant or making a contribution to the best explanatory model. 
Results suggested Spanish MNCs were happy to accommodate the institutional 
environment in Latin America provided there was certainty shareholder rights would be 
protected and country risk was perceived to be relatively low. Cultural affinity 
constructs were important but only two were statistically significant to explain 
differences in valuation. The latter pointed to a common cultural heritage between Spain 
and Latin America. Specifically, a small difference between Spain’s and the host 
country’s power distance index suggests Spanish MNC seemed to prefer countries (and 
companies) where there was a perception of a paternalistic style of management. Taken 
together with the relative importance of the masculinity index (i.e. same degree of 
gender differentiation) forceful argument could be made that, in such a context, the 
importance of interpersonal trust is high. 
At the same time the propensity for unions to influence negotiations and the 
potential value of an acquisition was important but again, not statistically significant.  
The instrumental variable for privatisation was no statistically significant at the 
1% level. Instead the number of potential candidates for acquisition was seen as more 
important. Together these effects pointed to the importance of changes in economic 
policies of Latin American governments as source for the emergence of the Spanish 
MNC. Privatisation was instrumental in developing local stock markets and allowed 
exploiting market-value differences in less developed countries (Porter, 1987, pp. 49 
and 52;  Hu, 1995, pp. 84-5). Privatizations, therefore, were a welcomed invitation for 
making expansion into foreign markets through acquisition attractive.  
                                                                                                                                               
7 Not shown for brevity but available from the corresponding author. 
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Absence of constructs related to wage effect suggested that neither greater 
efficiency nor the construction of an international platform (in the sense of increased 
global value integration) were a prime reason to explain internationalisation of Spanish 
entities. Rather than resource seeking or efficiency seeking, results from the 
econometric model suggested the strategies of Spanish firms responded to market 
seeking, that is, demand oriented FDI. Results suggesting a preference by Spanish firm 
in gaining access to foreign markets rather than an attempt to create global export 
platforms were consistent with those of Amman and Ferraz (2002) and Nachum, Jones 
et al. (2001). Market seeking strategies could well have resulted from the desire to 
satisfy unmet demand in foreign markets (e.g. utilities) or because of an excess supply 
in home markets (e.g. depositary institutions). The drive to increase demand for existing 
products and services was evident in that market seeking measures (Mij) had the greatest 
number of statistically significant constructs (that is, after considering financial 
constructs or those related to the potential to pay a premium for the target company).  
 Statistical significance of trend constructs suggested not all partners in Latin 
America were equally desirable. The greater the number of transaction for a single 
country in the same industry significantly reduced the number of potential acquisition 
targets. In combination with financial constructs (these been the greatest in number for 
the final model) suggested Spanish MNC were unwilling to pay a premium or enter a 
market through acquisition at “which ever the cost”. Spanish MNC were ready to pay 
“fair price” for their interest in (some or all) the assets. Otherwise would enter through a 
different mode (such as greenfield investments, export or licensing).  
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Links between Spanish and Latin America have a long history as Spanish FDI in 
the region dates to the 16th and 17th centuries. More recently, during the 1990s there was 
an important re-emergence of Spanish investments in the region. However, Spain’s 
investments in Latin America during the 1990’s cannot be examined without looking 
into what preceded such investments. That is to say, the ‘lost decade’ of the 1980’s 
lowered the overall attractiveness of the region. Multinational companies based in so 
called ‘Triad’ countries had the highest stock of FDI in the region but, at the time, were 
unwilling or unable to increase their investments. In particular, financial service 
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organisations retreated from international markets while dealing with debt renegotiation. 
Thereby, key players that otherwise would have competed against the Spanish banks 
were totally absent. Spanish bankers lead the investment process not only through their 
financial operations, but through their (controlled) subsidiaries in key countries.  
Trends and directions of aggregate FDI flows of Spanish investments into Latin 
America suggested that the competitive advantage of Spanish entities abroad was 
different from that at home. There was a marked concentration in some countries and 
selected industries but at the same time, there were a number of issues not explained by 
aggregate FDI data. For instance, some sectors where Spanish MNCs were absent in 
Latin America (such as consumer goods and pharmaceuticals) were part of the global 
dominance of MNCs based ‘Triad’ countries and this dominance helped explaining 
geographic and sector concentration of Spanish acquisitions in Latin America.  
Moreover, along side the apparent concentration of Spanish acquisitions in Latin 
America (within few countries and few markets), evidence was found suggesting there 
similar (significant) investments which went beyond utilities and banking. Following 
these trends and examining their statistical significance was the motivation to assess the 
determinants of Spanish FDI investment decisions in Latin America. Throughout this 
process, research result pointed to issues explaining the sources of competitive 
advantage for the Spanish MNC. 
Inferences on FDI decisions from highly aggregated data risks biased results 
because aggregate data offers little insights as to who owned the assets, who undertook 
the investments or what was the motivation to pursue such investments. As a result, 
research in this article documented empirical evidence based on cross-border 
transactions. Cross-border M&A transactions allowed ascertaining the motivation of 
individual entities rather than assuming the same behaviour by participants in different 
sectors. Statistical analysis of M&A activity suggested most transactions involving 
Spanish entities in Latin America were indeed not random occurrences nor a ‘blanket’ 
response to European integration. Concentration in a handful of countries resulted from 
market seeking initiatives rather a broad response to industrial policies or threats from 
other European entities entering Spanish home markets.  
During the 1990s, the Spanish MNC aimed to gain access to 'key' Latin 
American markets namely Mexico, Chile, Brazil and Argentina. Related to sector 
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distribution, Electric, gas and sanitary services (SIC 49) and Communications (SIC 48) 
took the second and third places in terms of M&A activity while the most active sector 
was Depository Institutions (SIC 60). The importance of the financial sector was based 
on the strong development in Latin America of the main Spanish banks: SCH and 
BBVA. However, statistical significance of cross-border activity in over half the 
economic sectors of Spain (as measured by SIC codes) made it hard to ignore the 
internationalisation of the Spanish economy during the 1990s and the role played by 
Latin America in that process. As such, demand oriented FDI dominated over a desire to 
gain access to natural resources (i.e. resource seeking) and a more efficient division of 
labour or specialisation of an existing portfolio of foreign and domestic assets (i.e. 
efficiency seeking).  
At the same time, it was interesting to see the absence (or statistical significance) 
of cross-border activity otherwise associated with main contributors to Spanish 
economic growth. In particular, agricultural production (SIC 2), agricultural services 
(SIC 7), leather products (SIC 31), apparel and accessory stores (SIC 56). This 
portrayed the mixed situation of the Spanish economy as both exporter and recipient of 
FDI; the combination of private enterprise (dominated in sectors such as amusement and 
recreational services, SIC 79 by small and medium sized firms) and the provision of 
services private and public entities (postal service, SIC 43); but also that Spain’s 
competitive advantage is not within activities of high value added or high technology 
such as electronic equipment (SIC 35 and 36) and education services (SIC 82).  
Suggesting that the comparative (i.e. owner specific) advantages of the Spanish firm are 
not absolute, that is, so as to out bid any other actual or potential competitor in 
international markets (as required by Porter, 1987) but sufficient to be superior to 
organisational forms found in Latin America (see further Hu, 1995; Dunning, 2000). 
An econometric model explored measures of market size effect, wage effects, 
'cultural affinity', overall trend (i.e. ‘herd’ effect) and financial dimensions unique to the 
transaction. Most financial dimension were statistically significant, many trend and 
cultural variables were discarded but at least two of each remained, as did constructs 
related to market (i.e. demand) effects, while and wage effects  were discarded. The 
most (statistically) significant variables in the most parsimonious estimation of the 
econometric model included the mode of acquisition, the rank of the target country 
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exports to Spain in Spain’s imports, country risk, Hofstede's (1991) power distance 
index and the growth rate in the overall number for cross-border transactions for that 
country.  All this suggested that buying into the right market was as important as 
acquiring the right target at a ‘fair price’. Econometric results were consistent with 
poorly developed financial markets and a strong preference of Spanish MNCs to acquire 
control (i.e. average ownership after transaction equal to 67%).  The analysis of the 
growth of Spanish firms in Latin America also highlights the advantages of privatisation 
to strengthen product and market positions rather than attempting to create global export 
platforms.  
The emergence of the Spanish MNC, as reported in this article, takes place 
during a period of heighten cross-border activity and in particular changed competition 
in global markets for financial service organisations. However, there are limitations to 
generalise on the effects of globalisation based on the last wave of cross-border activity 
behaviour (see further Evenett, 2003).  Nevertheless, the nature and intent behind 
Spanish acquisitions in Latin America is topic that still requires attention. In particular, 
documenting systematic differences between sectors involving a few transactions and 
those involving a large number of transactions. 
  
 
 
 
 
26 
Table 1: Geographic Distribution of Spanish FDI (1993-2001) 
(In millions of euros at nominal prices) 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
          
O.E.C.D. 1,260 1,589 2,819 3,285 4,712 7,142 24,088 44,657 47,356 
 67% 36% 57% 51% 52% 38% 39% 59% 63% 
Latin 
America 358 2,476 805 2,557 4,068 10,604 35,504 29,145 26,675 
 19% 56% 16% 40% 45% 56% 57% 38% 36% 
Rest of the 
world 274 351 1,325 576 341 1,049 2,256 2,379 546 
 14% 8% 27% 9% 4% 6% 4% 3% 1% 
TOTAL  1,893 4,416 4,949 6,418 9,121 18,796 61,848 76,181 74,577 
 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Spanish Ministry of Economy, Department of Commerce and Investment, UNCTAD (2002) and 
own estimates. 
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Figure 1: Spanish Acquisitions in Latin America, 1987-2001 
(Total cross-border M&A transactions involving Spanish firms by country) 
 
 
Others: countries with two or less transactions, namely Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay and Uruguay. 
Source: SDC (2002); own estimates. 
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Figure 2: Spanish Acquisitions in Latin America, 1987-2001 
(Sector distribution of cross-border M&A transactions by two digit SIC code;  
Sectors with more than seven transactions) 
 
Source: SDC (2002); own estimates. 
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Table 2: Top Spanish Acquiring MNCs in Latin America, 1987-2001 
(Companies involved in seven or more cross-border transactions) 
 
 
Two-
Digit 
SIC 
M&A Transactions Ownership 
  
Num. 
Trans. 
Accumulated 
Value 
(US millions)  
Rank 
Value 
Average 
Value 
(US millions)  
Average % 
of Equity Std Dev 
Rank 
Equity 
Telefonica 48 37 $24,692 1 $988 61 37.4 5 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya A 60 34 $7,766 4 $277 59 31.6 7 
Banco Santander Centr 60 27 $12,270 3 $767 60 35.2 6 
Repsol 13 17 $17,043 2 $1.420 66 29.1 3 
Corp MAPFRE SA 63 11 $123 7 $18 63 22.4 4 
Endesa SA 49 9 $3,575 5 $397 73 28.6 1 
Union Electrica Fenosa 49 9 $390 6 $78 68 25.0 2 
Source: SDC (2002); own estimates. 
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Table 3: M&A Activity of Spanish Firms in Latin America by Industry, 1987-2001 
(Sectors where target and acquirer were active but only one was statistically significant) 
  Target 
(Lat Am) 
Acquirer  
(Spain) 
SIC 
Code 
1987 U.S. SIC Description Value of 
Indicator, Apq 
Nº of 
transactions 
Value of 
Indicator, Apq 
Nº of 
transactions 
13 Oil and gas extraction  159** 12 54 2 
29 Petroleum and coal products  14 3 178** 16 
35 
Industrial machinery and 
equipment  0 0 223** 2 
36 
Electrical and electronic 
equipment  60 6 71** 4 
44 Water transportation  66 1 113** 5 
50 Wholesale trade--durable goods  0 0 335** 2 
62 
Security, commodity brokers, 
and services  9 4 83** 1 
76 Miscellaneous repair services  83** 1 0 0 
80 Health services  128** 4 0 0 
87 
Engineering and management 
services  98** 5 0 0 
95 
Environmental quality and 
housing  335** 2 0 0 
Sum   38  32 
** = Significant with a 95% confidence interval. 
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Table 4: M&A Activity of Spanish Firms in Latin America by Industry, 1987-2001 
 (Sectors where target and acquirer were active and both were statistically significant) 
  Target 
(Lat Am) 
Acquirer 
(Spain) 
SIC 
Code 
1987 U.S. SIC Description 
Value of 
Indicator, 
Apq 
Nº of 
transactions 
Value of 
Indicator, 
Apq 
Nº of 
transactions 
1 Agricultural production- crops  336 1 336 1 
15 General building contractors  96 2 113 3 
16 Heavy construction contractors  91 3 134 4 
17 Special trade contractors  168 1 209 2 
20 Food and kindred products  185 8 186 8 
21 Tobacco manufactures  336 1 336 1 
22 Textile mill products  335 2 335 2 
25 Furniture and fixtures  334 3 111 1 
27 Printing and publishing  83 7 108 14 
28 Chemicals and allied products  145 8 129 14 
32 Stone, clay, glass, and concrete products  279 15 279 13 
33 Primary metal industries  250 4 250 3 
37 Transportation equipment  167 2 266 4 
38 Instruments and related products  291 4 250 3 
39 Miscellaneous manufacturing industries  336 1 336 1 
45 Transportation by air  197 7 199 6 
47 Transportation services  195 6 150 4 
48 Communications  115 38 129 32 
49 Electric, gas, and sanitary services  154 45 143 31 
60 Depository institutions  132 48 152 55 
63 Insurance carriers  136 25 174 16 
65 Real estate  162 5 133 2 
70 Hotels, rooming houses, camp s, and other 
lodging places  
258 7 224 8 
73 Business services  141 27 126 23 
Sum   270  251 
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Table 5: Empirical determinants of cross-border M&A decisions, 1988-2001 
(Dependent Variable: Value of individual transaction / Total value of M&A in Spain for year i) 
  Unstandardised 
Coefficients 
Standardised 
Coefficients 
 
  B Std. 
Error 
Beta    
Intercept 0.1819 0.6590  0.2760  
      
FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF INDIVIDUAL TRANSACTIONS      
Unsolicited bid (y/n) 0.4728 0.0378 0.3305 12.4977  
Purchase financed through bank loan (y/n) -0.6261 0.0517 -0.6176 -12.1177  
Purchase financed through bond borrowing (y/n) 1.1591 0.1295 0.8102 8.9523  
Post merger gearing ratio 0.2610 0.0379 0.2574 6.8851  
Percent of transactions for the year where target and its head office are in the 
same country 0.1491 0.0309 0.3159 4.8288  
Total number of transactions for year i in country j 0.0130 0.0045 1.1435 2.8538  
Investor group helped to finance the transaction (y/n) 0.0385 0.0148 0.1337 2.6006 * 
Average number of days to finalize a transaction in country j during year i 0.0001 0.0000 0.0814 2.4002 * 
Seller's main office in same country as target -0.0172 0.0084 -0.2444 -2.0521 * 
Percent owned after transaction -0.0271 0.0136 -0.0853 -2.0018 * 
Type of acquisition8 0.0046 0.0025 0.0813 1.8462 ** 
DEMAND (MARKET SIZE) EFFECT      
Rank of Spain's imports in country's exports 3.4216 0.4071 0.9387 8.4044  
Accumulated value of Spanish acquisitions in year i / total cross-border M&A 
value in year I 0.0163 0.0056 0.2954 2.9137  
Accumulated value / total cross-border M&A purchases by Spain or country j in 
year I 0.2432 0.0943 0.5040 2.5796 * 
Accumulated value M&A Spain / total FDI inflow country -0.0887 0.0345 -0.4040 -2.5729 * 
Rank of country's exports to Spain in Spain's imports -11.8147 6.8449 -0.4009 -1.7261 ** 
Country risk index 0.2111 0.1252 0.2008 1.6851 ** 
CULTURAL AFFINITY EFFECT      
Masculinity index 0.1200 0.0426 0.2101 2.8180  
Power distance index 0.0770 0.0439 0.1890 1.7539 ** 
TREND      
Date of transaction between 1994 and 1998 (y/n) 0.0940 0.0245 0.2540 3.8311  
Growth rate in the overall number of transactions 0.0086 0.0045 0.1239 1.9196 ** 
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE      
Target is a utility (y/n) 0.0166 0.0082 0.0724 2.0256 * 
* = Significant at 5%; ** = Significant at 10%.
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Appendix: 
Unsuccessful Diversification of Spanish MNC by Industrial Sector, 1988-2001 
Table A.- Sectors without cross-border activity 
 
SIC Code 1987 U.S. SIC Description 
2 Agricultural production- livestock 
7 Agricultural services  
8 Forestry  
9 Fishing, hunting, and trapping  
12 Coal mining  
14 Non-metallic minerals, except fuels  
23 Apparel and other textile products  
30 Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products  
31 Leather and leather products  
43 Postal Service 
46 Pipelines, except natural gas  
52 Building materials, hardware, garden supply, and mobile  
53 General merchandise stores  
54 Food stores  
56 Apparel and accessory stores  
64 Insurance agents, brokers, and service  
72 Personal services  
75 Automotive repair, services, and parking  
79 Amusement and recreational services  
81 Legal services  
82 Educational services  
83 Social services  
84 Museums, art galleries, botanical and zoological garden  
86 Membership organizations  
88 Private households  
89 Miscellaneous services  
91 Executive, legislative, and general government  
92 Justice, public order, and safety  
93 Finance, taxation, and monetary policy  
94 Administration of human resources  
96 Administration of economic programs  
 
                                                                                                                                               
8 Acquisition (certain assets, minority interest, majority interest); buyback; or merger. 
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Table B.- 
Sectors where target or acquirer is active but neither is statistically significant 
 
 
 Target 
(Lat Am) 
Acquirer  
(Spain) 
SIC 
Code 
1987 U.S. SIC Description 
Value of 
Indicator, 
Apq 
Nº of 
transactions 
Value of 
Indicator, 
Apq 
Nº of 
transactions 
10 Metal mining  6 1 0  
24 Lumber and wood products  6 1 0  
26 Paper and allied products  6 1 0  
34 Fabricated metal products  0  41 1 
41 Local and interurban passenger transit  0  55 1 
42 Motor freight transportation and 
warehousing  
44 2 0  
51 Wholesale trade--nondurable goods  5 1 0  
55 Automotive dealers and gasoline 
service stations  
60 3 0  
57 Furniture, home furnishings and 
equipment stores  
5 1 0  
58 Eating and drinking places  0  47 1 
59 Miscellaneous retail  16 3 0  
61 Nondepository credit institutions  4 2 0  
67 Holding and other investment offices  11 13 40 51 
78 Motion pictures  10 1 0  
Sum   29  54 
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